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2 have found that opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment are efficiency-reducing (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007 , Nikiforakis, 2008 .
We conduct an experiment comparing cooperation dilemmas without punishment opportunities or with only one order of punishment to ones permitting multiple orders of punishment under varying information conditions. In our main treatments, each of 240 subjects is grouped with three others in sessions of 20 participants. Each makes decisions on allocating funds between a private account and a group account in a standard voluntary contribution design of 15 periods in fixed groups. As with past experiments, selfish rational actors with common knowledge of type are predicted to put all tokens in their private accounts, but in line with past results subjects in the Baseline (no punishment) condition initially put about half of tokens in the group account, their average contribution then declining with repetition (Ledyard, 1995 , Zelmer, 2003 . In treatment Punish 1, we add now-standard opportunities to punish fellow group members after being shown their contributions, in a second stage of each period. Punishing, because costly to the punisher, is not predicted of selfish rational actors, but like past studies the treatment generates much punishing, mostly directed at lower contributors and mostly from higher ones, and contributions are significantly higher than Baseline and show a rising rather than declining trend until the final period Gächter, 2000, Gächter et al., 2008) .
In our third treatment, Punish 2, each period has a third stage in which subjects learn the amount and originator of any punishment they received in the second one and can spend money to counter-punish. In their similar treatments, Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) found substantial counter-punishment, decline in first-order punishing, and more decline 3 of contributions. Consistent with the first finding, our subjects counter-punish 29% of punishing events. Nevertheless, average contributions are also significantly higher than Baseline in Punish 2, and there is no significant difference in contributions or earnings between Punish 1 and Punish 2. 83.3% of first-order punishing in Punish 1 and 95% in Punish 2 go to below-average contributors (two-tailed group-level Mann-Whitney test, z=-1.060, p=0.2892). As we show in the Appendix, in both treatments, below-average contributors increase their contribution from one period to the next by a larger amount the more punishment they receive. The pattern of counter-punishing also suggests presence of implicit norms: in Punish 2, a unit of first-order (stage 2) punishment given by a lower to a higher contributor (antisocial punishment in the terminology of Herrmann et al. 2008 ) triggers an average of 0.56 units of counter-punishment (in stage 3), whereas a unit of punishment from a higher to a lower contributor (prosocial punishment) leads to 0.24 units of counter-punishment.
Punish 2 allows a punished individual j to punish back her punisher i, but information about punishing or lack thereof between other pairs of group members is not made available, and thirdparty enforcement, such as punishing those who fail to punish low contributors or those who punish high contributors, is ruled out. We explore these omissions by conducting Punish 2´, a treatment in which we show subjects information about all punishments, then allow them to punish in the period's second punishment stage without restriction, keeping fixed subject identifiers for all periods a group interacts. Subjects are also shown a reminder of the previous period's contributions and punishments and of average contribution and punishments of each group member and dyad in periods before that, easing demands on memory. As in Punish 2, Punish 2´ manifests costly punishment and costly counter-punishment, the latter occurring on average in 41% of instances of first-order punishment, not statistically significantly different from the 29% in Punish 2 (two-tailed group-level Mann-Whitney test, z = -0.090, p = 0.9283). The pattern of counter-punishment is similar, with 0.85 units of counter-punishment per unit when the punishment is antisocial, versus 0.42 units when it is prosocial. 56% (62%) of antisocial punishment events draw counter-punishment in Punish 2´ (Punish 2), whereas only 24% (28%) of prosocial punishment events are counter-punished. The differences in frequency 6 of counter-punishment when punishment is prosocial versus antisocial are statistically significant in the linear regression models of Table 1 and similar ordered logit regression models (see Appendix Table A9 ). A pooled linear regression model (see Table A10 ) shows that frequency of counter-punishment of each type does not significantly differ between Punish 2 and Punish 2´. Table 1 . Linear probability regression model of probability of counter-punishment as a function of type of first-order punishment. Regressions include all period-subject pair observations in which i punished j in stage 2 of the period. The dependent variable is 1 if j punished i back in stage 3, else 0. In column (i) and (ii), antisocial punishment takes value 1 if j's contribution in 7 the period was greater than or equal to i's, else 0. Regressions include individual random effects and group-level clustering of errors. The result shows that counter-punishment occurs with probability of about 0.3 or 0.2 when punishment is prosocial, versus probabilities of about 0.53 or 0.56 when punishment is antisocial, with difference of counter-punishment incidence being statistically significant at the 1% level in each treatment. In column (iii) and (iv), the independent variable is an interaction term of the antisocial punishment dummy variable and the positive deviation of j's contribution from i's, arguably a measure of "how antisocial" the punishment event was. In column (v) and (vi), the independent variable is the product of the previous specification's deviation term and the amount of punishment i gave to j, hence modifying the column (iii) and (iv) variable to also account for the amount of punishment j is reacting to. When we add to the independent variables the total 1 st order punishment received by j, the coefficients and significance levels of the main explanatory variables remain the same, while the coefficient on the additional variable is not significant. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.05 *** p <
0.01
Regression analysis (see Table A4 and other Appendix tables) makes clear that the more a subject punishes in the first punishment stage, the more he or she is punished in the second. This holds both when first order punishment is prosocial and when it is antisocial. Indicator variables for giving no punishment or for failing to punish a low contributor when the opportunity arises are negatively associated with punishment received in the period's final stage, significantly so in several specifications (see Appendix Tables A5 -A7 received (see Appendix discussion of the Punish 2k treatment). Together, these results imply that the least higher-order punishment goes to non-punishers, hence higher-order punishment provides no net inducement to punish.
We conclude that whereas some experimental studies of cooperation have questioned whether the apparent benefits of peer punishment for cooperation can withstand the availability of higherorder punishment, our study of such punishment in a new laboratory experiment finds that the positive impact of first order punishment opportunities on cooperation is not an artifact of punishers being protected from higher-order punishment. Higher-order punishment does not significantly affect the cooperation-inducing effects of first-order punishment, among our subjects. 1 By the same token, whereas some evolutionary theorists have hypothesized that punishment of those who free-ride on punishment might explain how a tendency to punish could have evolved and stabilized, higher-order punishment shows no sign of encouraging first-order punishment in our experiment.
